


# Deep Learning for Power System Reliability Assessments

Liège Seminar, 09-05-2025

Dr. Jochen L. Cremer  
Associate Professor

# Introduction



# Delft AI Energy Lab

## Mission & objective

- combine groundbreaking ML with the reliable theory of the physical energy system
- make energy systems sustainable, reliable, effective

## Education

- EE4C12 ML for Electrical Engineering
- SET 3125 Machine Learning Workflows for Digital Energy Systems
- SC42150 Statistical Signal Processing
- SC42110 Dynamic Programming and Stochastic Control
- MOOC Digitalization of Intelligent and Integrated Energy Systems
- Crash course of “Data-science”

## Research

- Supervised learning for real-time grid assessment
- Distributed learning for power system congestion management
- Data-driven grid models for electricity load and weather forecasts
- Characterizing healthy/normal trajectories of complex dynamical systems using dictionary learning
- From fast Fourier transform to fast reinforcement learning

## Key innovations

- AI-based algorithms for grid operation
- Real-time security assessment and anomaly detection
- Real-time learning algorithms for control and security of complex dynamical systems

## Team



Jochen Cremer



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
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Luca Hofstadler



Betül Mamudi  
Paul Bannmüller



Runyao Yu



Perine Cunat



AI Initiative

<https://www.tudelft.nl/ai/delft-ai-energy-lab>

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
# Outline

1. Introduction to reliability management
2. Machine learning approaches
3. Monitoring: Real-time dynamic security
4. Control: Weakly-supervised learning for N-k probabilistic, static security
5. Challenges applying ML to reliability




**Experts are in charge to manually operate the power system based on experience and with the support of tools**

# A complex process




# What's the issue?

Interdependencies  
challenge manual rules



# Automation first realised where urgently needed






# Real-time security assessment of disturbances





Mert Karaçelebi

Phase angles [norm]



Time [s]

**Neural** ordinary differential equations



[1] Mert Karaçelebi, Jochen L. Cremer "Online Neural Dynamics Forecasting for Power System Security", *International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems* 2025

[2] Mert Karaçelebi, Jochen L. Cremer, "Predicting Power System Frequency with Neural Ordinary Differential Equations", *12th Bulk Power System Dynamics and Control Symposium and Sustainable Energy, Grids and Networks Journal*, 2025

# Why do system operators require reliability monitoring?




Houston, Texas 07 Feb 2021



Houston, Texas 16 Feb 2021


- Damages from the blackouts were estimated at **\$195 billion [1]**
- **Seconds away** from a total power blackout in Texas

# Power blackout 28 April 2025 Spain/Portugal



# N-2?


▶ 28<sup>th</sup> of April 2025 (CET)



# Power system reliability


*“...is the probability that an electrical power system can perform a required function under given conditions for a given time interval.”*

# Operating states of power systems



# Conventional (offline) dynamic security assessment

Simulating time-response



Numerical integration

ODE system 
$$\begin{cases} \dot{x} = f(x, t, x_0) \\ x_0 = (P_k^{16h}, Q_k^{16h}) \end{cases}$$

Forward Euler


$$x_{k+1} = x_k + hf(x_k, t_k)$$

**slow for large systems**

# Real-time dynamic security assessment

Objective: predicting security in real-time

In response, use corrective actions in (near) real-time






# (Preventive) real-time dynamic security assessment

For N-1 security


Preventive actions




# Curse of Dimensionality



1d: 3 regions



2d:  $3^2$  regions




3d:  $3^3$  regions



1000d: hopeless


As dimensionality grows: fewer samples per region.

# Security of power systems



secure


$$y = 0$$



insecure

$$y = 1$$

# Machine learning model to predict security



How to train  
and use  $f$ ?

# Challenges for reliability management

- More extreme weather events
- Higher grid load in the system
- Higher uncertainty
- Highly complex problem

## Opportunities for reliability management with AI

- Availability of better models and data (weather, grid data, etc)
- New AI techniques
- Once trained, models are quick in 'predicting', but challenges also exist

# Outline

1. Introduction to reliability management
2. Machine learning approaches
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# Supervised Learning for Surrogate Models

Notation: Power system  $s$ , model  $m$ , parameter  $x$

**Objective:** assess  $m(x) \rightarrow y$  very fast and often

## Surrogate approach



1. Generate a training dataset  $\Omega^T = \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i=1}^N$  where  $y_i = m(x_i)$  from the full simulator
2. Train surrogate  $f(x) \rightarrow \hat{y}$  with supervised loss  $\sum_{i \in \Omega^T} \|y_i - \hat{y}_i\|$
3. Use  $f(x_j)$  for new  $j \notin \Omega^T$

**Benefit:** speed at inference

## Applications


- Real-time dynamic security assessment ([8,9] and many others)

Two-dimensional example



## Challenges

- What if  $s$  and  $m$  changes? e.g., topology changes
- What if the model is inaccurate  $s \neq m$ ? e.g., inverter-based controls
- Need large, representative training data



# Physics-Informed Learning

**Objective:** surrogate learning enhanced with physics knowledge from model  $m$

**Idea:** Incorporate physics residual (e.g. from a PDE or simulator) to guide learning and improve generalization


## Physics-informed approach

1. Generate offline training dataset  $\Omega^T = \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i=1}^N$  with  $y_i = m(x_i)$
2. Train surrogate  $f(x) \rightarrow \hat{y}$  on composite loss  $\sum_{i \in \Omega^T} \|y_i - \hat{y}_i\| + \mathcal{L}_{phys}(f(x_i), m)$
3. Use  $f(x_j)$  for new  $j \notin \Omega^T$

**Benefits:** Better generalisation performance with **fewer training samples**


## Applications

- Extrapolation in time-domain for dynamic analysis in power systems



## Challenges

- Model inaccuracy  $s \neq m$
- **Changes in  $s$  or  $m$**
- Data sparsity
- Multi-loss scaling causes training instability
- Scaling issues to many physical loss terms in power systems





# Weakly-Supervised (E2E) Learning

**Objective:** learn models  $f(x)$  for downstream task even when exact labels  $y_i = m(x_i)$  from the simulator  $m$  are unavailable, uncertain, or only indirectly defined.


## Approach

1. Generate many inputs  $\Omega^T = \{(x_i)\}_{i=1}^N$
2. Model task loss  $\sum_{i \in \Omega^T} \mathcal{L}(m(f(x_i)))$
3. Use  $f(x_j)$  for new  $j \notin \Omega^T$

**Benefits:** learning for computationally expensive or ill-defined problems

## Applications

- Learn to predict effective inputs to OPF [13]
- Replace conventional solvers with NN [14]
- Distribution system state estimation [15]
- N-k security-constrained OPF [16]



## Challenges

- Inexact supervision  $s \neq m$  not so important as success defined by task-loss
- **System shift in  $s$  or  $m$**
- Data coverage. Diverse samples are needed for generalization


# Self-Supervised Learning

**Objective:** Learn a **useful internal representation** from unlabeled data by solving a **pretext task** — no human-labeled or simulator-labeled outputs required.

**Idea:** instead of training on  $(x_i, y_i)$  train on auto-generated pseudo-labels or tasks constructed from structure  $x_i$

## Approach

1. Generate many inputs  $\Omega^T = \{(x_i)\}_{i=1}^N$
2. Define self-supervised pretext loss  $\mathcal{L}_{pretext}(f(x_i))$
3. Train encoder  $\sum_{i \in \Omega^T} \mathcal{L}_{pretext}(f(x_i))$
4. Use  $f(x)$  for downstream *task* (e.g. forecasting, OPF, estimation)




**Benefits:** Good initialization when little data, good transfer to downstream tasks

## Challenges


- Design pretext loss and model architectures with broad set of tasks, grid conditions, topologies
- Generate large data sets
- ...

## Applications

- Natural Language Processing
- Weather foundational models
- Earth system foundational models [17]



## Load forecasting of users [18]



## Grid foundation models (GFM) [19]

[17] Bodnar, C., Bruinsma, W. P., Lucic, A., Stanley, M., Vaughan, A., Brandstetter, J., ... & Perdakis, P. (2024). A foundation model for the earth system. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2405.13063*.

[18] Bölät, Kutay, and Simon Tindemans. "GUIDE-VAE: Advancing Data Generation with User Information and Pattern Dictionaries." *arXiv preprint arXiv:2411.03936* (2024).

[19] Hamann, H. F., Gjorgiev, B., Brunschweiler, T., Martins, L. S., Puech, A., Varbella, A., ... & Sobolevsky, S. (2024). Foundation models for the electric power grid. *Joule*, 8(12), 3245-3258.

# Graph Neural Networks

**Objective:** Improve generalization performance in learning tasks on network-structured systems (like power grids)


**Idea:** embedding graph topology directly into the model architecture as bias

## Approach


1. Construct graph  $G = (V, \mathcal{E})$  with features on nodes and edges
2. Define  $f_{GNN}$  and learn with message passing on supervised loss  $\sum_{i \in \Omega^T} \|y_i - \hat{y}_i\|$
3. Use  $f(x_j)$  for new  $j \notin \Omega^T$  or on unseen graphs  $G'$

**Benefits:** Data efficient, generalisation to changes in topologies

Example:  $p \times p$  RGB image




Example: molecular graph



## Applications

- Graph neural solvers [20] for ACOPF [21]
- Distribution system state estimation [22]

Noisy measurements



Power flow equations

$$H(x) = \begin{bmatrix} P_1 - P_1(x) \\ Q_1 - Q_1(x) \\ \vdots \\ P_n - P_n(x) \\ Q_n - Q_n(x) \end{bmatrix}$$


Topology



## Challenges

- Model inaccuracy  $s \neq m$
- Long-range dependencies are difficult to learn. *Power system topology is sparse*
- Challenging to learn for *global* problems (e.g. ACOPF)

Good to learn local relationships



# Outline

1. Introduction to reliability management
2. Machine learning approaches
3. **Monitoring: Real-time dynamic security**
4. Control: Weakly-supervised learning for N-k probabilistic, static security
5. Challenges applying ML to reliability

# System operation




Experts are in charge to manually operate the power system based on **experience** and with **the support of tools**



Interpretable models


# Decision Trees as a model?

Two-dimensional example




Decision trees:



- Limited **expressive** power
- Fantastic **interpretability**



# Metrics for classification




# Metrics for classification





# Metrics for classification



## Two types of accurate predictions:


TN: Is secure and we think it is secure (GOOD)

TP: Is insecure and we think it is insecure (VERY GOOD!)

		Predicted Class	
		Positive	Negative
True Class	Positive	TP	FN
	Negative	FP	TN

Confusion Matrix

# Metrics for classification



## Two types of accurate predictions:

TN: Is secure and we think it is secure (**GOOD**)

TP: Is insecure and we think it is insecure (**VERY GOOD!**)

## Two types of wrong predictions:

FP: Is secure but we think it is insecure (**BAD**)


FN: Is insecure but we think it is secure (**VERY BAD!**)

		Predicted Class	
		Positive	Negative
True Class	Positive	TP	FN
	Negative	FP	TN

Confusion Matrix


**This can have a severe effect!**

# Metrics for classification



$$\text{Accuracy} = \frac{N_{TP} + N_{TN}}{N_{FP} + N_{TP} + N_{FN} + N_{TN}}$$

# Metrics for classification




Ratio of correctly found **insecure** cases to  
**predicted insecure** predictions

$$\text{Accuracy} = \frac{N_{TP} + N_{TN}}{N_{FP} + N_{TP} + N_{FN} + N_{TN}}$$

$$\text{Precision} = \frac{N_{TP}}{N_{TP} + N_{FP}}$$

# Metrics for classification



Ratio of correctly found **insecure** cases to **all insecure** cases


$$\text{Accuracy} = \frac{N_{TP} + N_{TN}}{N_{FP} + N_{TP} + N_{FN} + N_{TN}}$$

$$\text{Precision} = \frac{N_{TP}}{N_{TP} + N_{FP}}$$


$$\text{Recall} = \frac{N_{TP}}{N_{TP} + N_{FN}}$$

# Precision vs Recall

When do we observe the highest performance?



# Blackout predictions: Precision or Recall?



Houston, Texas 07 Feb 2021



Houston, Texas 16 Feb 2021

$$\text{Precision} = \frac{N_{TP}}{N_{TP} + N_{FP}}$$

$$\text{Recall} = \frac{N_{TP}}{N_{TP} + N_{FN}}$$

# Cost skewness: $C_{FN} \gg C_{FP}$

## Problem


- The two different false predictions have different costs.



- Damages from the blackouts were estimated at \$195 billion
- Seconds away from a total power blackout in Texas



# Metrics for classification



## Two types of accurate predictions:

TN: Is secure and we think it is secure (**GOOD**)

TP: Is insecure and we think it is insecure (**VERY GOOD!**)

## Two types of wrong predictions:

FP: Is secure but we think it is insecure (**BAD**)

FN: Is insecure but we think it is secure (**VERY BAD!**)

		Predicted Class	
		Positive	Negative
True Class	Positive	0	$C_{FN}$
	Negative	$C_{FP}$	0

## Two issues

- Cost-skewness:  $C_{FN} \gg C_{FP}$
- Class imbalance:  $\pi_+ \ll \pi_-$

# What a classifier can do

## Classify points

- is  $x$  positive?

## Rank points


- Is  $x$  'more positive' than  $x'$ ?

## Output a score $s(x)$

- 'How positive' is  $x$ ?


## Output a probability estimate $\hat{p}(x)$

- What is the (estimated) probability that  $x$  is positive?





# Probability estimation is not easy

- Scores  $s(x) \in [0,1]$  as probability estimates  $\hat{p}(x)$ ? **No!**




Based on  
training set

Platt scaling: Find  $\hat{p}(x) = \frac{1}{1+e^{As(x)+B}}$





# Cost-sensitive learning



$$Z^* = \frac{\Pi_- C_{FP}}{\Pi_- C_{FP} + \Pi_+ C_{FN}}$$

$\swarrow$  Probability of contingency       $\nwarrow$  'Impact' of contingency

$\hat{p}(x) \geq Z^*$   predict secure  
 $\hat{p}(x) < Z^*$   predict insecure

# The risk of relying on machine learning


Step 1: Compute risks when predicting  $x_i$  as secure  $y_i = 1$  and insecure  $y_i = 0$

$$R_{\text{secure}} = p_i p_c \hat{p}(x_i) C_{FN}$$

$$R_{\text{insecure}} = p_i (1 - p_c) (1 - \hat{p}(x_i)) C_{FP}$$

Step 2: Predict with lowest residual risk


$$R_{\text{secure}} \vee R_{\text{insecure}}$$



# Minimize risks by hybrid approach


## Machine Learning

- Fast
- Sometimes inaccurate



## Simulator


- Slow
- Always accurate




+

## Probabilistic approach

=



## Case study: French system




# Outline

1. Introduction to reliability management
2. Machine learning approaches
3. Monitoring: Real-time dynamic security
4. Control: Weakly-supervised learning for N-k probabilistic, static security
5. Challenges applying ML to reliability

# Problem overview

- Growing grid complexity
  - Challenging to maintain N-1 security
- Increasing number of unforeseen weather events
- Need for N-k considerations to increase reliability
- **Problem:** Conventional approaches don't scale well with the number of simultaneous outages  $k$





# Security constrained optimal power flow (SCOPF)

Objective: minimize cost

Constraints: In = out  
Generator limits  
Line flow limits

Contingency Constraints: Line flow limits

$$\min_{n \in \Omega^G} \sum c_n P_{G_n}$$

$$B \cdot \delta = P_G - P_D$$

$$P_{G_n}^{min} < P_{G_n} < P_{G_n}^{max} \quad \forall n \in \Omega^G$$


$$F_l^{min} < F_l < F_l^{max} \quad \forall l \in \Omega^L$$

$$F_l^{min} < F_l^c < F_l^{max} \quad \forall l \in \Omega^L, \forall c \in \Omega^C$$



Combinatorial  
complexity

# Conventional approaches



Solving a **large optimization** problem can be slow

- Benders decomposition
- Column and constraint generation algorithm with robust optimization
- Line outage distribution factors (**LODF**)

Machine learning approaches often rely on **labeled** training data



- Intractable for increasing  $k$



$$F^c = F^0 + LODF_{N-k} \times F^0$$

# Probabilistic security for N-k failures

- Compute probabilities of all contingencies
- Spatial correlation between line outages
- Compute joint probabilities using a copula analysis



# Proposed constraint-driven approach

## Main advantages

- Weakly-supervised -> so **no labeled data** needed
- Never actually solve an SCOPF



## Contributions

- The deterministic constraint-driven approach to approximate N-k SCOPFs, considering all line contingencies using LODFs.
- The computational graph memory reduction for fast and efficient implementation.
- The probabilistic security assessment to formulate a N-k risk-based security criterion, providing an alternative to the current deterministic N-1 security criterion.




LODF = line outage distribution factor  
SCOPF = security constrained optimal power flow

# Proposed constraint-driven approach




# Proposed constraint-driven approach



## 2) Feasibility Restoration

- With  $\hat{P}_{G_n}$  compute predicted line flow  $\hat{F}_l^0$
- Prediction might **violate** DC PF equations
- Map prediction to feasible region constrained by DC PF equations

# Proposed constraint-driven approach




## 3) Post-contingency

$$F^c = F^0 + LODF_{N-k} \times F^0$$

$$F_l^{min} < F_l^c < F_l^{max} \quad \forall l \in \Omega^L, \forall c \in \Omega^C$$

# Proposed constraint-driven approach



1) Dispatch cost

$$\lambda_c \sum P_G c_G$$

2) Line flow violation pre-contingency

$$\lambda_0 \|ReLU(|\hat{F}^0| - F^{max})\|_1$$

3) Line flow violation post-contingency

$$\lambda_1 \|ReLU(|F^c| - F^{max})\|_1$$


4) Power imbalance

$$\lambda_2 \|\sum \hat{P}_G - \sum P_D\|_1$$

$$Loss = \lambda_c \sum P_G c_G + \lambda_0 \|ReLU(|\hat{F}^0| - F^{max})\|_1 + \lambda_1 \|ReLU(|F^c| - F^{max})\|_1 + \lambda_2 \|\sum \hat{P}_G - \sum P_D\|_1$$



# Proposed constraint-driven approach



1) Dispatch cost

$$\lambda_c \sum \mathbf{P}_G \mathbf{c}_G$$

2) Line flow violation pre-contingency

$$\lambda_0 \|\text{ReLU}(|\hat{\mathbf{F}}^0| - \mathbf{F}^{\max})\|_1$$

3) Line flow violation post-contingency


$$\lambda_1 \|\boldsymbol{\pi}_{N-k} \cdot \text{ReLU}(|\mathbf{F}^c| - \mathbf{F}^{\max})\|_1$$

4) Power imbalance


$$\lambda_2 \|\sum \hat{\mathbf{P}}_G - \sum \mathbf{P}_D\|_1$$

$$\text{Loss} = \lambda_c \sum \mathbf{P}_G \mathbf{c}_G + \lambda_0 \|\text{ReLU}(|\hat{\mathbf{F}}^0| - \mathbf{F}^{\max})\|_1 + \lambda_1 \|\boldsymbol{\pi}_{N-k} \cdot \text{ReLU}(|\mathbf{F}^c| - \mathbf{F}^{\max})\|_1 + \lambda_2 \|\sum \hat{\mathbf{P}}_G - \sum \mathbf{P}_D\|_1$$

# Sparsity LODF matrix


 Non-zero values  
 Zeros

$$F^c = F^0 + LODF_{N-k} \times F^0$$




FLODF = 'Full LODF'

	k	1	2	3
39-bus sparsity [%]		98.5	97.6	97.5
118-bus sparsity [%]		99.6	99.3	99.0



LODF = line outage distribution factor

# Reducing the graph





# Case studies

- IEEE 39-bus and 118-bus test systems
- $k = \{1, 2, 3\}$
- Baseline: iterative contingency screening with LODFs
- Code: <https://github.com/TU-Delft-AI-Energy-Lab/Constraint-Driven-SCOPF>



LODF = line outage distribution factor

# Islanding




Removing islanding cases



# Performance 118-bus system

- Evaluate ability to identify line violations
- **Only** consider single, double or triple line outages
- Post-cont violations [%] indicates the percentage of samples where line violations occur

Proposed approach  
Baseline





# Performance 118-bus system





# N-3 proposed approach

# N-3 baseline








### N-3 proposed approach



# Reducing computational graph



Reduction in memory




Reduction in computation time

# Probabilistic security assessment

Proposed probabilistic security enhances reliability


Compare reliability indices

- Loss of Load Expected (LOLE)
- Expected Energy not Served (EENS)



# Extreme event


- Individual probabilities change due to an earthquake
- Recompute joint probabilities
- Recompute reliability indices



■ N-2 SCOPF

■ Probabilistic approach

Potential for increased resiliency





# Outline


1. Introduction to reliability management
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# Generalisation to changes in $s$ or $m$

The model performs well not just on training data, but on **unseen scenarios** — new grid states, topologies, contingencies, or time horizons.




## Extrapolation in continuous domain



(a)  $I_d$  current trajectory


## Extrapolation in nonlinear domain (discrete)



(a)  $I_d$  current trajectory


# Challenge: Data-efficiency

- Data efficiency is critical
- Embedding **inductive bias** and learning **task-aware representations** helps supervised models generalise better — even with limited labels.




## Sampling synthetic data & use real-data

### Snapshot sampling




### Time-series foundational models



# Model inaccuracy $s \neq m$ (data quality issues)

*"All models are wrong, but some are useful", George E. P. Box*

- Example challenges
  - Distribution: Inaccurate transformer-tap positions
  - Transmission: Converter-based control models are unknown
- Possible techniques: Parameter estimation to develop probabilistic and deterministic models, discrepancy learning





# Conclusions

- For many decades, AI has been investigated for power system reliability -> demonstrating promising ideas
- Promising: New techniques, availability of data, models, industry R&D commitments

## Open research challenges

- Handling changes in data, and model inaccuracy -> Adaptive GNNs
- Curse of dimensionality -> Self-supervised learning
- Addressing risks, confidence, and trust in ML models
- A large amount of data is needed
- Integrating various concepts

# Thank you

## Speaker

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Code: <https://github.com/TU-Delft-AI-Energy-Lab>



Olayiwola  
Arowolo



Mert  
Karaçelebi



Goran Strbac



Bastien Giraud



Ali Rajaei

# References & code

**Weakly supervised learning for power systems** (Example code: <https://github.com/TU-Delft-AI-Energy-Lab/Deep-Statistical-Solver-for-Distribution-System-State-Estimation>)

- Bastien Giraud, Ali Rajaei, Jochen L. Cremer “Constraint-Driven Deep Learning for N-k Security Constrained Optimal Power Flow”, *Electric Power System Research and 2024 IEEE Power System Computation Conference* [Code: <https://github.com/TU-Delft-AI-Energy-Lab/Constraint-Driven-SCOPF>]
- B. Habib, E. Isufi, W. v. Breda, A. Jongepier and Jochen L. Cremer, “Deep Statistical Solver for Distribution System State Estimation,” *IEEE Transactions on Power Systems*, 2023, doi: 10.1109/TPWRS.2023.3290358.

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- A. Bugaje, J. L. Cremer, M. Sun, G. Strbac, “Selecting DT Models for Security Assessment using ROC- and Cost-Curves”, *Energy and AI*, 2021: 100110.
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**Interpretable models** (Example code: <https://github.com/JochenC/From-optimization-based-machine-learning-to-interpretable-security-rules-for-operation>)

- J. L. Cremer, I. Konstantelos, G. Strbac, “From Optimization-based Machine Learning to Interpretable Security Rules for Operation”, *IEEE Transactions on Power Systems*, 2019
- J. L. Cremer, I. Konstantelos, S. H. Tindemans, G. Strbac, “Data-driven Power System Operation: Exploring the Balance between Cost and Risk”, *IEEE Transactions on Power Systems*, 2018

## Fast training of models

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- Mert Karaçelebi, Jochen L. Cremer, “Predicting Power System Frequency with Neural Ordinary Differential Equations”, *12th Bulk Power System Dynamics and Control Symposium and Sustainable Energy, Grids and Networks Journal*, 2025

## Generalisation challenge:

- Olaiyiwola Arowolo, Jochen Stiasny, Jochen Cremer, “Exploring the Extrapolation Performance of Machine Learning Models for Power System Time Domain Simulations”, *12th Bulk Power System Dynamics and Control Symposium and Sustainable Energy, Grids and Networks Journal*, 2025



Thank you for your attention

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